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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the nexus between political instability and economic growth in 10 CEE countries in 
transition in the period 1990-2009. Our results support the contention that political instability defined as a 
propensity for government change had a negative impact on growth. On the other hand, there was no causality 
in the opposite direction. A sensitivity analysis based on the application of a few hundred different variants of 
the initial econometric model confirmed the abovementioned findings only in the case where major 
government changes were applied to the definition of political instability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The factors which determine economic growth are among the most extensively studied subjects in the 
economic literature. Early contributions on these topics were based mainly on the neoclassical growth model 
and were concerned almost exclusively with strictly economic determinants of growth. Insufficient data has 
caused that empirical literature on the relationship between political instability and economic growth is 
relatively recent. Having said that, in one of the earliest contributions to the subject, Kuznets (1966) claimed 
that political disorder may be responsible for a low rate of economic growth, especially in periods of 
government change. In the early 1990s North (1990) said that a society’s institutional framework plays an 
important role in the long-term performance of an economy. Therefore, the choice of the political and 
economic system which would be best for the general development of a society (including economic growth), 
is an important research avenue for economists around the world.
Economists usually stress that an unstable political system may slow down investment or speed up inflation, 
and in consequence reduce the GDP growth rate. Theoretically, an inverse relationship is also possible. The 
economic troubles of a country may constitute major factor in social tensions and political instability, which in 
turn may cause the fall of a government. Until the early 1990s, the world was in general characterized by two 
models of economic development: socialism: led by the Soviet Union, and capitalism, led by the United 
States. The breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought about remarkable democratic reforms 
across the globe. In the literature there are many detailed analyses on the impact of political reforms and 
democratization on economic growth, mostly for the Asian-Pacific region or Latin America. This paper 
focuses on the effect of political instability on economic growth in the CEE transition countries over the last 
two decades. Political instability in this region, reflected in relatively frequent government changes and 
shuffles, was strongly interrelated with the democratization process, which took off at the beginning of the 
1990s.  
The motivation to analyze the transition economies of CEE is twofold. First, it seems interesting to check 
whether economic growth in this group of countries, which in last two decades have launched a whole range 
of political, economic and social reforms, has somehow suffered from the relatively large amount of political 
manoeuvres, government changes and major cabinet reshuffles which took place in the period 1990-2009. The 
answering to this question may turn out to provide useful information for researchers and politicians, as it may 
constitute the initial stage of a more complex analysis of the economic consequences of various forms of 
political instability. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this particular group of young democracies has not 
attracted very much the researchers so far, most likely due to a lack of sufficient data. In this contribution we 
describe the dependencies between political instability and economic growth in the CEE region using the most 
recent statistical data and advanced econometric techniques. 
In this paper special attention is paid to those problems which are still unclear in the light of the previous 
literature. The most important issue in this context is the measurement of political instability and the direction 
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of causality between the variables under study. First of all we examine whether political instability is 
reflected in the rate of economic growth and to what extent this impact is negative. We will also check the 
existence and sign of reverse causality running from the GDP rate to political instability. Moreover, in 
contrast to previous papers, we try to use objective criteria to measure the importance of political events 
(government change).  
This paper consists of seven sections. The following section reviews the major strands of existing literature 
on the relationship between political instability, political freedom, democracy and economic growth and it 
creates a theoretical framework for further empirical analysis. In section 3 the research conjectures are 
formulated, mainly on the basis of the results of previous papers. In the fourth section a description of the 
data used in this study is given. Section 5 contains some remarks on the theoretical models which underpin 
the assumed relationship along with a description of the methodology used. The empirical results and a
discussion of them are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper and provides some general 
suggestions for further research. 
2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
The nexus between political instability and economic growth has been one of the most important topics in 
empirical research in economics in the last decade. The major goal of this research was to establish the 
structure of causal interrelations. Sociologists and economists have tried to test whether a stable political 
system is a vital precondition for economic growth or whether economic growth creates the foundations of 
political stability. 
According to the earliest contributions by Kuznets (1966, 1973) technological progress is necessary for 
economic growth, although it must be accompanied by liberal democratic institutions, which provide citizens 
with political freedom, and which allow them to participate in the political process. This is coupled with 
economic freedom, which in turn enables their participation in the economy.   
In general, previous papers on political stability-growth links may be classified into four groups. The first 
strand in the economic literature argues that political instability has a negative impact on economic growth, 
but that there is no causality in the opposite direction (see for example Alesina et al., 1996). Another group of 
contributions supplies evidence that economic growth causes political stability, but not vice versa (for 
example Borner and Paldam, 1998). Another tendency in the literature argues that causality in the relationship 
between political instability and economic growth runs both ways (Zablotsky, 1996; Gyinmah–Brempong and 
Traynor, 1999). Finally, the last group of papers contains evidence supporting a lack of causality between the 
variables (see for example Campos and Nugent, 2000). In general, previous investigations also vary with 
respect to the samples or countries that different contributors investigate.  
In some of the previous studies on the relationship between the political instability and economic growth both 
direct and indirect effects of instability on GDP have been found and discussed (for example Barro, 1991; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Schneider and Frey, 1985). The major conclusion was that because of the negative 
impact of political instability, there are indirect consequences for most important growth factors such as 
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savings or investment. Another strand of research, also related to indirect effects, was focused on the well-
known ‘brain drain’ effect (for example, Adebayo, 1985; Kwasi, 1992), which is the process of declining 
human capital caused mainly by political disorder. 
An issue which is especially related to the nexus between political instability and growth is whether 
democratic institutions are harmful or conducive to growth. In some previous papers, democracy was made 
responsible for not providing enough political stability and for slowing down economic growth (for example 
Yu, 2001; de Haan, 2007). In many democracies the government is based on coalition partners, who are often 
ideologically opposite to each other. Therefore, any instability in the relationships between coalition partners 
can easily lead to a withdrawal of support for the government.  
Newly-elected governments in democratic countries often tend to make frequent changes in the country’s 
policy in both domestic and international areas. Even if a particular political party hangs onto full executive 
power, noisy demonstrations on the streets and harsh criticism by the mass media can lead to violent and 
unexpected political change. Sudden and frequent policy changes with regard to business are likely to deter 
investment, which in turn may hamper economic growth. Therefore, some contributors think that if 
democracy leads to this kind of instability, it is unsuitable for developing countries where economic growth 
and the reduction of poverty are top priorities. It is very likely that these two goals have been deemed, at least 
to some extent, main priorities in the case of CEE countries as well, especially in the early 1990s. 
The different points of view about the impact of political freedom (accompanied by political instability in the 
early stages of democratization) on the growth rate are widely reflected in the economic literature. Barro 
(1996, 1999) found that the net effect of more political freedom on economic growth is rather uncertain. He 
found that democracy speeds up economic growth when the initial level of democracy is relatively low. 
However, the relationship becomes negative once a moderate amount of political freedom has been attained. 
Barro stressed that an increase in political rights in the worst dictatorships supports the growth rate and 
investment as result of limitations on governmental power. However, an attaining a moderate amount of 
democracy and a further increase in political freedom hampers economic growth and investment because a 
serious problem with redistribution arises.  
There is controversy on the impact of democracy on growth in many other papers. In the opinion of Clague et 
al. (1996) and Haggard (1997) democracy will support economic growth more than authoritarian regimes. A 
democratic political system creates conditions conducive to growth because it allows the most active and 
talented citizens to participate fully in business. Other studies have also found a significant positive 
association between democracy and economic growth, especially in the direction from democracy to growth 
(see for example Nelson and Singh, 1998; Pourgerami, 1988; Fedderke and Klitgaard, 1998; de Haan et al.
2006). In a contribution by Nelson and Singh (1998) it is emphasized, however, that political freedom and 
democracy in developing countries could undermine the effectiveness of government policy with discipline, 
law and order. Therefore, under a democratic system a government may be less efficient in performing its 
basic obligations and responsibilities, and in supplying basic services. In a paper concerned with economic 
convergence and government policies, Sachs and Warner (1995) found that in order to catch up with rich 
countries, poor countries should implement appropriate economic policies, especially to support open foreign 
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trade and to protect private property rights. In the late 1990s Rodrik (1998, 1999) found evidence that 
countries without internal social conflicts and with strong conflict-managing institutions grow much faster 
than countries with a divided society and weak institutions of conflict management. 
According to the economic literature political freedom plays a crucial role alongside other determinants of 
economic growth and income convergence. However, views concerning the importance of political freedom in 
the context of economic growth are often extremely controversial. Sen (1999) defined development as the 
process of the growth of real freedoms. He stressed that the expansion of freedom, including its political 
sense, should be the primary end and the principal means of the development of countries. In contrast, 
Friedman (1962) argued that economic freedom is itself a component of the general concept freedom, and that 
it is a necessary precondition for the achievement of political freedom. The most controversial hypothesis 
albeit quite popular among economists, is known as the ‘Lee conjecture’, named after the former Prime 
Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. In his opinion a lack of political freedom supports rapid economic 
growth, while democracy and civil rights hamper it. This conjecture was based on the observation that a few 
authoritarian economies in Asia, that is South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and China, grew much faster than 
their relatively more democratic counterparts. This conjecture was widely discussed by Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993) and Vasil (2001). Some researchers claim that the Lee hypothesis is also supported by the 
growth in several authoritarian South American countries, which achieved a mean annual growth rate of 2.15 
percent in the period 1946-1988, while the average world growth was 1.31 percent in this period. 
Besides the discussions on theoretical issues, the controversy on the role of political systems in economic 
growth is also reflected in the empirical evidence. In one of the earliest empirical studies Scully (1988) used a 
cross-sectional approach to check the interrelations between institutions and economic growth in 115 
economies between 1960 and 1980. He established that the institutional framework had a palpable effect on 
economic growth. He found that political freedom was the reason for the almost three times faster growth in 
stable democracies than in economies which were authoritarian or only partly free. By contrast, de Haan and 
Siermann (1995, 1996) demonstrated (using a sample from the years 1963-1988 and a set of 97 countries) that 
the positive relationship between political freedom and economic growth detected in most cross-sectional 
empirical studies was not robust and depended on political and cultural discrepancies. Similarly, Farr et al.
(1998) and Wu and Davis (1999) found that political freedom had little influence on economic growth. 
According to these authors most important area of freedom in promoting economic growth is economic 
freedom.  
Xu and Li (2008) collected data for a sample of 104 countries between 1970 and 2003. They found that 
political freedom has positive effects on economic growth at later stages of social and economic development. 
They found also evidence for the idea that economic freedom has greater effects on income convergence in 
the OECD countries, but that political freedom also promotes convergence. 
Alesina et al. (1996) used growth rates of GDP per capita as the dependent variable and government changes 
to measure political instability. They examined a panel of 113 countries and found that political instability had 
negative impact on GDP growth, whereas there was no dependence in the opposite direction. Within a similar 
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research framework Campos and Nugent (2000) found for African countries that political instability was a 
reason for slower economic growth. However, no relationship was found for any other group of countries.  
To summarize, researchers have not yet reached consensus on the role of democracy in economic growth, 
neither from a theoretical nor empirical perspective. On the other hand, a negative relationship between 
political instability and growth has been reported quite often, some contributors even claim that it has been 
established as a ‘stylized fact’.
2
However, empirical studies on political instability-growth links are often 
criticized due to the large amount of ad-hoc-selected explanatory variables and the lack of rigorous stability 
analysis of the results.
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Moreover, most of the previous research in this area was conducted for relatively large 
groups of countries. This in turn could easily lead to modelling difficulties due to possible heterogeneity bias, 
which is hard to control in simple models. Where detailed research has been conducted on a particular region,
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it was usually an analysis of some Latin American or Asian case.   
The post-communist CEE economies have not attracted much attention of researchers, mainly due to lack of 
datasets of sufficient size. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first contribution to address the 
political instability-growth nexus in case of this group of young European democracies. Moreover, this 
research deals with some typical but often-omitted modelling difficulties, as subjectivity of describing the 
importance of political events and analysis of sensitivity of empirical results. As already mentioned, these two 
issues are crucial for obtaining replicable and robust empirical results.    
In the next section we will formulate the main research conjectures of this paper. The hypotheses will be 
formulated on the basis of the empirical results and major suggestions from recent research in the area of 
political instability-economic growth links. 
3. MAIN RESEARCH CONJECTURES  
As mentioned in the previous section a considerable number of recent papers have emphasized the negative 
impact of political instability on economic growth. Therefore, our first hypothesis reflects these expectations 
in the case of CEE economies in transition:  
CONJECTURE 1: Political instability had a significant and negative impact on the economic growth of 
countries in the CEE region during the period of transition.  
Previous research has shown that the opposite relationship is also often observed, that is a slowdown in 
economic growth may cause a rise in political instability as society puts the poor economic performance of a 
country down to an inferior executive and wishes to unseat the government. To summarize, our analysis 
should verify the following: 

2This is not obvious for some groups of countries. For example, in the case of Italy the high number of government 
changes and adjustments over many years was accompanied by relatively high economic growth.
3Durlauf and Quah (1998) provide excellent review of the empirical literature on this topic.
4The fact that political instability-growth links are strongly region-dependent was underlined by many authors; see for 
example Campos and Nugent (2000).  
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CONJECTURE 2: The economic growth of the transition economies in the CEE region was a causal 
factor for the level of political stability. This impact had a positive sign.   
Testing both these conjectures may provide some important information on the nature of the relationship 
between economic growth and political instability. As well as the direction and sign of any causality, it is also 
important to examine whether political instability had a tendency to remain at relatively the same level from 
one year to the next. It can significantly extend the description of the structure of instability-growth links 
obtained after checking the first two conjectures, because supplementary information on the dynamic structure 
of these links may be gained. In general, previous research has not led to a consensus about the importance 
and sign of the impact of recent political instability on the level of instability in the future. However, 
following the suggestions of Alesina et al. (1996), one may formulate the following: 
CONJECTURE 3: Political instability in the CEE region has shown persistence. 
All the hypotheses listed above will be tested by carefully selected econometric methods. Details on the 
dataset are presented in the next section. 
4. THE DATASET AND ITS PROPERTIES
In this paper we use a dataset consisting of a panel of annual observations for new EU members in transition 
from the CEE region.5 In general, the dataset covers the period 1990-2009, although for some countries the first 
observation is often from later than 1990. In other words, our analysis takes into account the whole period of 
the transition of CEE economies. Some details on countries and periods included in the analysis are presented 
in table 1:  
COUNTRY SAMPLE PERIOD
Bulgaria 1990-2009 
Czech Republic 1993-2009 
Estonia 1991-2009 
Hungary 1990-2009 
Latvia 1991-2009 
Lithuania 1991-2009 
Poland 1990-2009 
Romania 1990-2009 
Slovakia 1993-2009 
Slovenia 1991-2009 
TABLE 1. Countries and periods analyzed in this paper 
In general, the data applied in this paper may be classified into two main categories. The first group includes 
economic variables, which are related to measures of the economic growth of CEE transition economies and 

5 In the period 2004-2007 twelve countries joined the EU. However, Malta and Cyprus have not been taken into 
consideration in this study since the evolution of the economies of these countries is significantly different from that of 
the ten other new EU members, more importantly, the economies of Malta and Cyprus have never been in a transition 
phase.
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various proxies of main growth factors.6 Despite years of research, the existing literature has not yet reached a 
consensus about a typical set of variables that may affect economic growth. Following previous papers which have 
reviewed the existing literature (Bleaney and Nishiyama, 2002; Levine and Renelt, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 
1997, among others) we have selected a relatively small subgroup from hundreds of the control variables, 
which are usually considered as most important. The second group of indicators describes various aspects of 
political instability. Table 2 provides details on all variables along with a definition of some simple 
mathematical operators used to transform the variables in further parts of the paper: 
Full name 
Abbreviation
used 
Definition Unit 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
GDP growth 
rate*
GROWTH 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
% 
Tertiary school 
enrolment*
EDUC 
Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of tertiary 
education. This indicator is often used to measure the level of human capital.7
% 
Trade 
openness**
OPEN 
Exports plus imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The 
export and import figures are in national currencies from the World Bank and United 
Nations data archives.  
% 
Unemployment 
rate*
UNEMPL 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. 
% 
Inflation rate* INFL 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services. 
% 
World growth 
rate*
WGROWTH 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
% 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY VARIABLES 
Major 
government 
change 
MCHANGE 
This variable is equal to one if there was a substantial government change, that is if 
new prime minister was representing a different party than the previous one. We also 
assumed that whenever outgoing or new prime minister was not a member of political 
partyMCHANGE took the value 1. 
- 
Government 
change 
GCHANGE 
This variable is equal to one if there was any type of government change (major or just 
regular), and zero otherwise.  
- 
MATHEMATICAL OPERATORS 
Name Parameters The symbol used and result of transforming series xt
Lag operator  p ( ) :t t ppx x −− =
Differencing operator - 1:t t tx x x −∆ = −
Lagged-average operator n ( )
1:
n
t i
n i
t
x
x
n
−
=
=
∑
TABLE 2. Brief description of data and operators used in this paper 
*   data from World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank 
** data from Penn World Table 7.0 

6Since for some of the economic control variables used the data is often published with a two-year lag, the sample 1990-
2009 was the longest available at the time of preparing this paper.  
7The impact of human capital on economic growth has frequently been underlined by many authors, see for example 
Alesina et al. (1996), Barro (1991).
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The assessment and measurement of the role of government changes or adjustments is not an easy goal. In this 
paper we used the concept of measuring the political instability as the propensity for government change, 
which has attracted a considerable attention in previous research (see for example Alesina et al., 1996). 
However, our measures of political instability are somewhat different from those of previous papers. The most 
important difference lies in the fact that we do not formulate any set of subjective criteria to distinguish 
‘major’ government changes from the regular transfers of executive power. In our definition government 
change is said to be a major one if a new prime minister represents a different political party from the previous 
one. It is clear that this approach reduces the harmful subjectivity bias and allows the use of the most recent 
data, as no preliminary (that is subjective, time-consuming and sample-size-reducing) discussions on the 
importance of government change need to be conducted.
8
 Moreover, in our opinion this definition seems 
adequate to capture the real decisions of investors as they seldom have the time and resources to perform 
academic deliberations. Instead, they treat a change of prime minister (and the following political 
reorientation of the executive) as the main indicator of the importance of government change which may have 
some impact on their future economic activities. Although one may express some doubts on the importance of 
all-type government change (GCHANGE) for the economic performance of a country, since it mainly covers 
regular elections (which in themselves - except for early elections - are not indicators and/or consequences of 
political instability), we believe that application of this variable may also provide some interesting conclusions 
as it allows comprehensive comparisons between the effects of major and regular executive transfers.
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Table 3 describes some basis information about our data. In addition, we have presented some preliminary 
results obtained for particular subsamples of the data, which shed some light on the possibility of the existence 
of simultaneous relations between economic growth and both indicators of political instability: 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES POLITICAL INSTABILITY VARIABLES
Variable Mean Standard deviation Variable Mean Standard deviation
GROWTH 2.55 5.65 
MCHANGE 0.31 0.43 EDUC 43.54 19.41 
OPEN 106.83 32.72 
UNEMPL 10.57 4.71 
GCHANGE 0.46 0.49 INFL 30.24 93.49 
WGROWTH 2.65 1.49 
SUBSAMPLE STATISTICS
GROWTH 
2.11 5.89 MCHANGE=1 
2.82 5.51 MCHANGE=0 
1.95 6.16 GCHANGE=1 
3.10 5.10 GCHANGE=0 
GROWTH greater than full-sample average 
MCHANGE 
0.28 0.46 
GROWTH not greater than full-sample average 0.33 0.47 
GROWTH greater than full-sample average 
GCHANGE
0.41 0.49 
GROWTH not greater than full-sample average 0.56 0.51 
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics of examined data 

8This means that the data used in this research is easily obtainable by every Reader, which allows a full reproduction of 
the results or an analysis of some CEE-related research problems not discussed in this paper.
9Note that even if there was no major government change, the pre-election uncertainty could have a significant impact 
on the performance of an economy (for example an impact on the strategy and decisions of investors based solely on 
their expectations).
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The average growth rate in CEE economies in the period of transition was around 2.5 percent. On the other 
hand the average frequency of (major) government change was at a level of 0.46 (0.31), which indicates that 
there was roughly a (major) government change almost every two years (three years). The second part of table 
3 (related to subsample statistics), provides even more interesting results. When we restrict our sample only to 
years with (major) government change we can see a 1.15 percent (0.71 percent) drop in average growth in 
comparison to an election-free period. A negative contemporaneous dependence is also visible from the 
opposite perspective, as the average frequency of both types of government change rises when we restrict the 
sample to data points characterized by GROWTH not greater than the full-sample average.
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However, this basic approach omits many important issues and does not provide any formal evidence for the 
existence, direction and sign of any causal dependencies between growth and political instability. Therefore, 
in the next section we will present some details on the econometric procedures which are most suitable for 
testing causal dependencies in the context of the specification of the variables used.  
5. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY
The findings in the previous section provide some evidence for claiming that both variables related to political 
instability may indeed be simultaneously related with economic growth.
11 
Moreover, the propensity for 
government change is not directly observable, which in the light of the previous remark requires the 
application of more sophisticated simultaneous equation models, in which one of the endogenous variables is 
continuous and the other is dichotomous.  
5.1 GENERAL FORM OF THE MODEL
The structural form of our model includes two equations, where one endogenous variable stands for political 
instability and the other represents economic growth. Thus, we consider the following model:                                       
        (1) 
where *PI is a latent and not directly observable endogenous variable which reflects the actual level of 
political instability. As usual for models with unobservable variables, we assume that there exists an indicator 
variable, denote it PI, which takes the value of 1 if * 0PI >  and 0 otherwise.12 The symbol X denotes a set of 
exogenous variables which enter both equations, while X1 (X2) stands for a set of exogenous variables which 

10 In general, both these findings, that is the lower growth in government change periods and the higher frequency of 
government change in periods characterized by below-average growth, were also confirmed by the results of similar 
calculations conducted individually for each country.
11
The endogenity of measures of political instability and economic growth has been underlined by many authors; see for 
example Gyinmah–Brempong and Traynor, (1999), Blanco and Grier, (2009). 
12For more detail on these types of simultaneous models see Maddala (1983). In this paper we consider two possible 
definitions of indicator PI , that is in the first case we set PI GCHANGE= and then we set PI MCHANGE= .
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
,
GROWTH PI X X
PI GROWTH X X
γ β α ε
γ β α ε
 = + + +

= + + +
11 
are only in the growth (political instability) equation. As usual, the symbols ε1 and ε2 denote errors terms with 
variances equal to 
2
1σ  and 
2
2σ  respectively, and 1 2 1 2 1, , , ,γ γ β β α  and 2α  are the parameters to be estimated.  
The estimation of model (1) cannot be performed through the application of standard econometric methods 
(such as 2SLS and so forth), as one of the dependent variables is latent. A suitable estimation procedure was 
presented in Maddala (1983). Since nowadays this method is a standard econometric procedure, we will only 
provide a brief description of it. 
Because *PI is not directly observable, in the initial stage one should define
13 ( ) 1** * 2PI PI σ −= and then 
rewrite model (1) in the following form:  
(2) 
(3) 
After defining the set ALLX , which contains all the exogenous variables that occur in both equations in model 
(1),
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the following estimation procedure of the system of simultaneous equations should be performed: 
PROCEDURE I 
STEP 1: Estimate through OLS the model 1 1ALLGROWTH X η= Π + , where 1Π  stands for the vector of 
parameters and 1η  stands for error term. Denote the predicted values as HATGROWTH . 
STEP 2: Estimate through probit the model ** 2 2ALLPI X η= Π + , where 2Π  stands for the vector of 
parameters and 2η  stands for the error term. Denote the predicted values as **HATPI . 
STEP 3: In the next stage rewrite models (2) and (3) placing the fitted values obtained in STEP 1 and 
STEP 2 on the right hand side of both equations: 
(4) 
(5) 
and then use OLS and probit to re-estimate equations (4) and (5) respectively. 
STEP 4: After estimating models (4) and (5) it is necessary to correct the standard errors, because the 
estimation in STEP 3 was based on **HATPI  and HATGROWTH , not on an appropriate **PI  and 

13This is done only for presentation purposes. In general, we could follow the traditional approach and simply at the 
beginning assume that the error term in the second equation in model (1) has a unit variance.
14
Using the traditional notion based on an observation matrix this definition could be expressed by the 
formula: ( )1 2ALL C CX X X X= + + , where ‘ C+ ’ denotes a column-wise concatenation operator, that is if 1,..,
1,...,
ij i n
j m
A a
=
=
 =    and 
1,..,
1,...,
ij i n
j k
B b
=
=
 =   then 1,..,
1,...,
: i nC is
s m k
A B c =
= +
+ =    where 
if
if
is
is
ij
a s m
c
b s m j
≤
= 
= +
.
**
1 2 1 1 1 1
** 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
GROWTH PI X X
PI GROWTH X X
γ σ β α ε
γ β α ε
σ σ σ σ
 = + + +


= + + +

**
1 1 1 1 1
**
2 2 2 2 2
HAT
HAT
GROWTH PI X X
PI GROWTH X X
γ β α ξ
γ β α ξ
′ ′ ′ = + + +

′ ′ ′= + + +
12 
GROWTH variables, which biases the estimators of standard errors (and the results of significance tests). 
Maddala (1983) provides a relatively simple algorithm for correcting standard errors. To save space we 
will not present the full details of this method. A practical implementation of this procedure along with a 
theoretical description may be found in Keshk (2003).
15
    
In the next subsection we will characterize the estimation procedures used in cases when a simultaneous effect 
is present in exactly one of equations in model (1).    
5.2 RECURSIVE MODELS
If some preliminary calculations (or economic theory) provide a solid basis for assuming that exactly one of 
parameters 1γ  and 2γ  equals zero in (1), then a simultaneous model turns into a recursive model. As a 
consequence, the general procedure presented in subsection 5.1 should be replaced by more adequate 
methods. The details of estimation procedures depend on which restriction: 01 =γ  or 02 =γ  is applied. 
5.2.1 THE RESTRICTION 1 0=γ
This corresponds to the problem of the estimation of a probit model with continuous endogenous covariates. 
Suitable estimation techniques for this type of model are well-known, thus we will not provide a detailed 
description. The theoretical fundamentals of these estimation techniques may be found in Newey (1987). The 
author proposed a suitable application of Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares (AGLS; see Amemiya, 1978) 
estimator in order to efficiently estimate the parameters of a probit model, when it includes a continuous 
endogenous regressor. This procedure is currently one of the standard ways of estimating the variant of model 
(1) discussed above.
16
5.2.2 THE RESTRICTION 2 0γ =
In general the condition 02 =γ  generates two interesting situations. First, if the continuous variable is only 
observed given some selection criterion defined by the latent endogenous variable, we have an example of 
what is known as a sample selection model. It is clear that this kind of specification cannot be applied in the 
case of our model (as growth is always observed), so we will not discuss it in detail. For a detailed discussion 
of such models and their methods of estimation see Barnow et al. (1981), Breen (1996), and Maddala 
(1983).
17

15PROCEDURE I is directly available in STATA software throughout the application of command ‘cdsimeq’.
16 Professional econometric software (for example STATA) offers several possibilities of estimating such models. 
However, as mentioned in Adkins (2009) it is also relatively easy to implement this variant of AGLS procedure in all 
open-source economic software, as long as some basic programming is applicable.
17STATA’s procedure ‘treatreg’ can perform all the necessary estimations for such models in two-stage and maximum 
likelihood variants.
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When there is no solid reason to make use of a sample selection model, the condition 02 =γ  implies a typical 
recursive model with a continuous and latent variable. Methods for fitting such models are discussed in detail 
in Maddala and Lee (1976). 
In order to briefly describe these estimation procedures consider the initial form of the (recursive) model:18
(6) 
(7) 
In general the maximum likelihood function takes the form (Maddala and Lee, 1976): 
                                          (8) 
where the joint density function of 1 2( , )y y  is defined as:  
  (9) 
and 
   (10) 
and 1 2( , )f ζ ζ  denotes the joint density function of error term 1 2( , )ζ ζ . 
If the error terms in (6) and (7) are independent then (8) takes the form: 
         (11) 
where f stands for the density functions of error term 1ζ and F denotes the cumulative distribution function of 
error term 2ζ . Thus, maximizing L is equivalent to maximizing likelihood functions for both equations 
separately. Of course if 1ζ  and 2ζ are both normally distributed this means that equation (6) may be 
estimated through OLS and (7) through probit. 
From our perspective a much more interesting case is when 1ζ  and 2ζ  are not independent.19 As mentioned 
by Maddala and Lee (1976), in this case we have to obtain consistent initial estimates to start the iteration of 
the maximizing likelihood procedure. If we assume that the error term has a two-dimensional normal 
distribution:
20
(12) 

18To present suitable formulas in a transparent way in this subsection we use the shortened notation 
1
=y GROWTH  and 
2
=y PI  ( * **
2
=y PI ).
19Compare the indications of significant simultaneity reported in table 3.
20As already mentioned, the unit variance of 2ζ comes directly from the specification of models (2) and (3), but one just 
might as well assume this condition in model (1) without loss of the generality of further results.
*
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we can get consistent initial estimates for an iteration-based maximization of (8) quite easily after performing 
the following procedure: 
PROCEDURE II 
STEP 1: Estimate (7) through probit.  
STEP 2: Rewrite (6) in the form: 
   (13) 
where 1 2 2 2 2 1( ( ))y F X Xω γ β α ζ′′ ′′ ′′= − + + . Next estimate the model:  
 (14) 
and denote the vectors of the estimated coefficients as 1 1,β α′′ ′′
)
)
 and 1γ ′′
)
. Next denote the estimated residuals 
of the first equation as 1 1 1 1 1 1 2y X X yζ β α γ′′ ′′ ′′= − − −
) )
) )
. 
STEP 3: Calculate a consistent estimator of 21σ  using formula ( ) ( )2 121 1
1
T
i
Tσ ζ −
=
 
=  
 
∑
)
)
, where T denotes the 
sample size. 
STEP 4: Regress through OLS the following equation: 
 (15) 
where 1 1 1 1:Z y X Xβ α′′ ′′= − −
)
)
, 
( ) ( )( )22 2 21 12 2 2 21:
2
X X
U e F X X
β α β α
pi
−′′ ′′
− + 
′′ ′′= − + 
 
)
)
)
)
and η  is the error term. The 
consistent estimator of 12σ is equal to the estimator a
)
 obtained from (15). 
PROCEDURE II provides consistent estimators of the unknown parameters of (6) and (7), which then may be 
used as initial values in the iterating procedure of maximising the likelihood function (8).
21
Some preliminary remarks need to be made prior to the construction of an initial model. These remarks are 
presented in the next subsection. 
5.3 THE INITIAL MODEL
In general, we assume that the factors determining political instability may be divided into two groups. The 
first one includes measures of economic performance, while the second one contains indicators of political 
unrest. Following the suggestions of Alesina et al. (1996), the set of economic variables determining political 
instability in the initial version of our model consists of the contemporaneous growth rate ( GROWTH ), the 

21The STATA procedure ‘cmp’ allows an estimation of this type of recursive model. See Roodman (2011) for more 
details.
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) ( ( ))
( )
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + + − + + =
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + +
y X X F X X y F X X
X X F X X
β α γ β α γ β α ζ
β α γ β α ω
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2( )′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + +y X X F X Xβ α γ β α ω
,Z aU η= +
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one-period-lagged growth rate (
1
GROWTH
−
) and the one-period-lagged world growth rate ( )1WGROWTH− . 
Since the importance of the first two variables is rather straightforward, because they allow a distinction 
between the contemporaneous and lagged effects of economic growth on political instability, the inclusion of 
the third one may be helpful in determining whether economic performance relative to the rest of the world is 
relevant to the popularity of a government in a particular country. As for measures of political unrest, in the 
initial model we used the 3PI  variable, defined as the average of the past values of PI from a three year 
period.
22
  
The specification of the growth equation includes contemporaneous political instability (PI) defined as the 
propensity for government change, lagged growth (to measure the persistence of the economic growth 
process), lagged world growth (to capture the possible effect of the world business cycle on the growth rates 
of individual countries) and changes in the unemployment rate.
23
 In the initial model we have used the 
employment-related control variable mainly because the labour force is assumed to be the most important 
variable production factor in the short-run (the concept, assumptions and features of one-factor production 
functions are described in Mansfield (1991) and Takayama (1985)).
24
To summarize, the abovementioned justification of the choice of identification restrictions gives us 
1 1
[ , ]X GROWTH WGROWTH
− −
= , 
1
X UNEMPL= ∆ , 2 3X PI= . Thus, our initial model may be written as: 
(16) 
As mentioned in the introductory subsection we use two different specifications for the instability variable, 
that is we use GCHANGE and MCHANGE to indicate a change in the sign of the latent political instability 
variable.  
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section the results of testing for causal dependencies between the variables under study are presented. It 
is important to note that throughout this section we use the notation introduced in table 3 to describe the 

22See table 3 for a description of this operator. This type of variable corresponds to the idea of measuring persistence of 
political instability presented in Alesina et al. (1996).
23
 The average of lagged government changes is not considered in the growth equation as they are assumed to influence 
growth only indirectly (through a direct impact on the PI variable). We will return to this issue when discussing the 
empirical results.
24In the initial model we decided to use a change in unemployment rather than its level, as we focus on growth rates 
rather than levels of GDP (which are directly influenced by levels of unemployment). However, different choices of 
control variables will be extensively discussed in a subsequent part of the paper.
1 11 1 12 1 1 1
2 21 1 22 1 2 3 2
GROWTH PI GROWTH WGROWTH UNEMPL
PI GROWTH GROWTH WGROWTH PI
γ β β α ξ
γ β β α ξ
− −
− −
= + + + ∆ +

= + + + +
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relevant mathematical operators. As already mentioned, at the initial stage of empirical research we focus on 
the group of exactly identified models.
25
6.1. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES
In this subsection we consider the case where PI GCHANGE= . Table 4 contains the results of the estimation 
of model (16) through the application of PROCEDURE I:
26 
COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATES
 Growth equation 
Political instability 
(government change) 
equation 
GROWTH - -0.03 (0.72) 
GCHANGE -2.60 (0.09)  
1
GROWTH
−
0.34 (0.00) -0.39 (0.28) 
1
WGROWTH
−
0.89 (0.01) -0.07 (0.54) 
∆UNEMPL -0.52 (0.01) - 
3
GCHANGE - -0.82 (0.04) 
Constant -0.98 (0.26) 0.48 (0.15) 
TABLE 4. Results of estimation of model (16) with PI GCHANGE=
Analysis of the results of the estimation of the growth equation provides evidence of a significant (but only at 
a 10 percent level) and negative causal impact of GCHANGE on GROWTH. The coefficients of both lagged 
growth rates and the unemployment-related variable were also significant (this time even at a 1 percent level) 
and had the expected signs, which in turn suggests that in the transition period the effects of the persistence of 
economic growth, the impact of the world business cycle and the importance of employment were statistically 
significant.  
On the other hand, in the government change equation the GROWTH coefficient, although slightly negative, 
was not statistically significant at any usually considered level. Both lagged growth rate coefficients were 
negative, but also statistically insignificant. The 3GCHANGE  coefficient was significant (at a 5 percent level), 
and negative, implying that the more unstable was the period from year t-3 to year t-1 the smaller was the 
chance of a government change in year t. This suggests that the effect of the persistence of political instability 
was rather negligible. 
In order to confirm the major finding reported in table 4, that is a significant unidirectional and negative 
impact of government change on economic growth with no significant impact of growth (or lagged growth) on 
government change, we ran some additional regressions. In order to perform a sensitivity analysis we applied 

25In this paper we will also examine examples of overidentified models, allowing X1 and X2 to have different numbers of 
elements.
26Numbers in round brackets denote the significance levels of estimated coefficients.
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a variety of different sets of control variables in the growth model. In general, we analyzed all possible ways 
of constructing 
1
X  using the control variables (EDUC, OPEN, UNEMPL, INFL). Besides variables in their 
levels, we also used the transformations of them, which were obtained after the application of the three 
operators described in the last three rows of table 3. Therefore, our sensitivity analysis took into account the 
level, first difference, lagged value and average of the lagged values of each one of the four control economic 
variables. We focused on cases where 
1
X  contains one or two elements.
27
 By this means we obtained 112 
different variants of set 
1
X : 16 singletons (four variables times four forms of each variable) and 96 two-
element combinations (six pairs of variables times four forms of first variable times four forms of the second 
variable in each pair).
28
 For each research variant PROCEDURE I was run and then suitable outcomes were 
analyzed. The ratios of obtaining significant coefficients at a 10 percent level are presented in table 5:
29 
SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change equation 
GROWTH - 0/16 - 1/96 (1-) 
GCHANGE 4/16 (4-) - 21/96 (21-)  
1
GROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 0/16  96/96 (96+) 0/96   
1
WGROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 0/16  91/96 (91+) 0/96  
3
GCHANGE - 5/16 (5-) - 48/96 (47-)  
TABLE 5. Sensitivity analysis for model (16) with different control variables and PI GCHANGE=
As one can see, only some conclusions formulated after the analysis of the outcomes presented in table 4 
turned out to be robust with respect to the model specification details. The contemporaneous negative effect of 
government change on economic growth was confirmed only in 25 out of 112 cases. The inverse 
contemporaneous relation was clearly rejected (a significant relation reported only in one case). Similarly, the 
measure of recent political instability (
3
GCHANGE ) was found to be significant and negative in the 
government change equation in less than half of all cases. However, the significant and positive impact of 
both lagged growth rates turned out to be robust for the growth equation, regardless of the variant of 
1
X  used.   
Since the results presented in tables 4 and 5 provide solid evidence for claiming that economic growth does 
not significantly enter the political instability equation, in the final stage of the sensitivity analysis we 

27In the cases when X1 was a two-element set and X2 remained unchanged (singleton), we should formally examine the 
issue of overidentifying restrictions. This, however, is rather a minor aspect in our research, as our main goal is to 
describe the causal links between political instability and economic growth in CEE countries. In order to reduce the risk 
of multicollinearity, we restricted the sensitivity analysis to cases of no more than two growth-specific control variables 
in the growth equation.
28Since an analysis of the significance and signs of the coefficients of the control variables in the growth equation is less 
important for the main goal of this paper, we do not present these results in tables 5-9. The detailed results of all 
estimations are available from the authors upon request.
29 In order to verify the empirical results we were forced to control not only significance levels but also the signs of 
coefficients. Thus, in tables 5-9 in the round brackets the numbers of significant parameters with expected sign are 
additionally presented (for example (7-) denotes finding significant negative coefficient in seven cases).
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assumed that 
2
0γ = and re-estimated all models using PROCEDURE II. Table 6 contains the ratios of obtaining 
significant coefficients at a 10 percent level: 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change 
equation 
GCHANGE 11/16 (11-) - 75/96 (73-)  
1
GROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 0/16 (0) 96/96 (96+) 0/96 (0) 
1
WGROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 0/16 (0) 96/96 (96+) 0/96 (0) 
3
GCHANGE - 15/16 (15-) - 90/96 (88-) 
TABLE 6. Sensitivity analysis in recursive models (
2
0γ = , PI GCHANGE= ) 
The empirical results obtained for 112 recursive models are a little different from the results of the sensitivity 
analysis presented in the previous table. First of all, the government change coefficient in the growth equation 
was found to be negative and significant in many more cases (75% of the overall amount), although in 28 
cases this result was still not confirmed. This time the measure of recent political instability (
3
GCHANGE ) was 
found to be significant in almost 92 percent of cases. The lagged growth coefficients were positive and 
significant in all growth equations, and insignificant in each government change equation. To summarize, we 
found some evidence in favour of Conjecture 1. On the other hand, Conjectures 2 and 3 should rather be 
rejected. 
The results presented in this subsection provide some evidence for claiming that an increase in the propensity 
for government change has hampered the growth rates of CEE economies during the whole transition period. 
However, after performing the sensitivity analysis some doubts on the robustness of this finding also arose. 
This could be due to the fact that the definition of the indicator variable used in this part of the research was 
strongly influenced by regular government changes, which in general do not reflect political instability. 
Therefore, in the next subsection we examine the results of analogous research, this time, however, conducted 
solely for major government changes.    
6.2. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND MAJOR GOVERNMENT CHANGES 
In order to examine the structure of causal links between economic growth and political instability, this time 
defined as a propensity for major government change, we re-estimated the 112 models introduced in the 
previous subsection for PI MCHANGE= . In the following table the ratios of obtaining significant 
coefficients at a 10 percent level are presented: 



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SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
GROWTH - 1/16 (1-) - 2/96 (2-) 
MCHANGE 15/16 (15-) - 86/96 (85-)  
1
GROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 1/16 (1-) 96/96 (96+) 1/96 (1-) 
1
WGROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 1/16 (1-) 95/96 (95+) 0/96  
3
MCHANGE - 10/16 (10-) - 72/96 (72-) 
TABLE 7. Sensitivity analysis for model (16) with different control variables and PI MCHANGE=
The results presented in table 7 lead to the conclusion that major government changes had a significant and 
negative impact on economic growth in about 90 percent of models tested, while for all-type executive 
transfers this was reported only in about 22 percent of cases. Similarly, the political unrest coefficient 
(
3
MCHANGE ) was found to be significant and negative in around 73 percent of cases, while for its analogue 
in the previous part of the research (
3
GCHANGE ) this ratio was around 47 percent. On the other hand, the 
results obtained for lagged growth rates in both equations were similar to the case of models constructed for 
GCHANGE .  
Since the results presented in table 7 provide strong evidence for saying that economic growth does not 
significantly enter the major government change equation, in the next stage of the research we re-estimated all 
recursive models using PROCEDURE II and assuming that PI MCHANGE= . Table 8 contains the ratios of 
obtaining significant coefficients at a 10 percent level: 
SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
MCHANGE 16/16 (16-) - 96/96 (96-) - 
1
GROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 0/16 96/96 (96+) 0/96 
1
WGROWTH
−
16/16 (16+) 0/16 96/96 (96+) 0/96 
3MCHANGE - 16/16 (16-)  
- 96/96 (96-) 
TABLE 8. Sensitivity analysis in recursive models (
2
0γ = , PI MCHANGE= ) 
As we can see the results presented in table 8 provide a solid basis for stating that the unidirectional negative 
effect of executive transfers on economic growth was much stronger for major government changes than for 
all changes (including regular ones).  
The difference between the results obtained for major and overall government changes were even more 
distinct when all significance tests were re-run at a 5 percent and 1 percent levels. A significant negative 
impact of MCHANGE on GROWTH was confirmed in nearly all cases, while for GCHANGE these ratios were 
definitely much lower (even below 25% for the sensitivity analysis at 1% level). The ratios of obtaining 
significant coefficients are presented in table 9: 
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5 PERCENT LEVEL
[1 PERCENT LEVEL] 
PI MCHANGE= PI GCHANGE=
 Growth equation 
Political 
instability 
equation 
Growth equation 
Political 
instability 
equation 
PI 
112/112 (112-) 
[110/112 (110-)] 
- 
[-] 
75/112 (75-) 
[26/112 (26-)] 
- 
[-] 
1
GROWTH
−
112/112 (111+) 
[112/112 (111+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
112/112 (112+) 
[112/112 (112+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
1
WGROWTH
−
112/112 (112+) 
[112/112 (112+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
112/112 (112+) 
[112/112 (112+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
3PI
- 
[-] 
112/112 (112-)  
[112/112 (112-)] 
- 
[-] 
110/112 (110-) 
[106/112 (106-)] 
TABLE 9. Results of joint sensitivity analysis in recursive models (
2
0γ = ) 
As can be seen in table 9, we also found strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that for government 
changes, especially major ones, the effect of persistence was not present. To summarize, in the case where 
major government changes were chosen as indicators of political instability, we found very convincing 
evidence in favour of Conjecture 1. On the other hand, our analysis confirmed that in this research variant 
Conjectures 2 and 3 should be definitely rejected. 
Finally, we also examined the sensitivity of the results in the case where 
22 : PIX = . We re-ran all regressions 
in basic and recursive variants using indicators of major and all-type government changes. In general, the 
previous results also turned out to be robust to this re-specification of the PI equation, thereby confirming the 
significant and negative impact of government changes, mainly major ones, on economic growth.
30
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
CEE economies in transition are a particularly interesting group of countries on which to conduct tests on the 
dependence between political instability and economic growth. Firstly, for the two last decades these countries 
have been transforming themselves from centrally planned systems into developed market economies. This
process was accompanied by various political reforms and a general improvement in social consciousness. 
The nations of this part of Europe have got new opportunities and striven for a better standard of living. One 
of the most important preconditions of this is the quality of the executive. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 
the period of transition there has been quite significant political unrest in CEE countries, as the authorities 
were forced to satisfy the rising expectations of the voters. This paper was intended to investigate whether this 
political unrest and government instability, probably inevitable (at least to some extent) in the first years of 
transition, have indeed hampered the economic growth of this region. Secondly, we wanted to check whether 
the reverse relationship was also significant, that is whether the economic performance of these countries was 

30These supplementary results are available from the authors upon request.
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a significant factor in their propensity for government change. To the best of our knowledge, all these CEE-
related problems have not been investigated by researchers so far.  
In this paper we applied a framework within which political instability is defined as the propensity for 
government change. To distinguish major government changes from regular ones we applied an additional 
indicator variable related to a change of the ruling party. This had the advantage of reducing the bias of much-
criticized subjective measures of the importance of political events. Moreover, we used the most recent time 
series on economic growth and four economic control variables, usually with data from the very first year of 
the transition of the CEE countries. Finally, to check the sensitivity of the empirical results, we examined 
several hundred possible modifications of the initial and restricted models using suitable and recent estimation 
techniques.  
The empirical results of this paper lead to few major conclusions. First, during the transition period of CEE 
economies the causal dependence between economic growth and political instability ran only in one direction 
– from political instability to growth rate. Moreover, we found convincing and robust evidence for saying that 
this effect was negative and significant for major government changes. In the case of all-type government 
changes (including regular ones) this negative impact was robust to the model specification when the 
sensitivity analysis was conducted at a 10 percent level, although much less convincing results were obtained 
for a sensitivity analysis conducted at a 5 percent and 1 percent levels. Both these findings indicate that 
political instability, measured as a propensity for major government change, hampered the economic growth 
of new EU member countries in transition. Another important conclusion is that government changes (major 
and regular) were not persistent, that is more recent political adjustments have reduced the likelihood of 
elections in the following year. Although this is not very surprising for regular government changes (as 
regular elections take place every four years), it has far more important implications for major government 
changes. When we compare this result with the previous remarks (that is a negative impact of major changes 
on growth) we can draw a general conclusion of this paper: Major government changes hindered the 
economic growth of new EU members in transition. However, these changes were not persistent. In other 
words, from the very beginning of the transition of CEE economies it is true that political instability was 
harmful for economic growth. Having said that, the empirical results of this paper (that is lack of persistence 
in government changes) seem to confirm that the people of this region have clearly opted for more democracy 
and stability in politics, which in turn has had an indirect positive impact on economic growth. On the other 
hand, the lack of causality in the opposite direction may suggest that after the collapse of the former 
authoritarian political and economic systems in the CEE, the frequent changes of governments (especially in 
the first decade of transition) were not only due to economic crises and poverty, but primarily due to the lack 
of experienced specialists who could solve the new problems and face new challenges. 
Due to the relatively short time series available, this paper focused solely on short-run dependencies. 
However, when more data is available, an analysis of the long-run dependencies between economic growth 
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and political instability in CEE transition economies will be an interesting research avenue to extend and 
supplement the outcomes of this paper. 
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